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Abstract: Large product variety in mass customization involves a high internal complexity level inside a company’s 
operations, as well as a high external complexity level from a customer’s perspective. To cope with both 
complexity problems, an information system based on agent technology is able to be identified as a suitable 
solution approach. The mass customized products are assumed to be based on a modular architecture and 
each module variant is associated with an autonomous rational agent. Agents have to compete with each 
other in order to join coalitions representing salable product variants which suit real customers’ require-
ments. The negotiation process is based on a market mechanism supported by the target costing concept and 
a Dutch auction. Furthermore, in order to integrate the multi-agent system in the existing information sys-
tem landscape of the mass customizer, a technical architecture is proposed and a scenario depicting the main 
communication steps is specified. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Mass customization is a business strategy that 
aims at satisfying individual customers’ needs nearly 
with mass production efficiency (Pine, 1993).The 
development of mass customization is essentially 
due to the advances realized in modular product ar-
chitectures and flexible manufacturing systems. 
However, the progress in the fields of information 
technologies and artificial intelligence for the sup-
port of Internet based customer-supplier interactions 
can be considered as the most relevant enablers for a 
successful implementation of the strategy. Rauten-
strauch et al. (2002) pointed out that information 
systems provide the necessary support for enter-
prises pursuing mass customization.  
The information which arises during the interac-
tion process between the customer and supplier 
serves to build up a long-lasting individual customer 
relationship (Piller, 2001). Due to high customer ori-
entation, mass customization induces a variety-rich 
environment. However, customers generally do not 
seek out variety per se. They do only want the 
choice that fits to their needs.  
The resulting variety in mass customization trig-
gers a high complexity level that leads to additional 
costs. Moreover, because of the limited human in-
formation processing capacity and lack of technical 
product knowledge, excessive variety confuses cus-
tomers who are overwhelmed by the complexity of 
the decision making process. Therefore, the main 
goal should be to find an optimal product variety 
which leads to the optimal cost-benefit-relation. For 
example, Blecker et al. (2003) propose a key metrics 
system to cope with the internal variety-induced 
complexity and emphasize the importance of the in-
teraction systems to reduce the external complexity 
experienced by customers during the buying process. 
From this point of view, we can identify two 
challenges. Firstly, the mass customizer must be 
supported by an information system to efficiently 
cope with variety. Secondly, it is relevant to assist 
customers with adequate information tools during 
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 the individualization process in order to lead them in 
a fast paced manner and with a low amount of effort 
to their optimal choice. In this paper, after a short 
description of the main variety problems in mass 
customization, we formally define a multi-agent 
based approach supporting dynamic variety-forma-
tion and steering enabling mass customizers to face 
both depicted challenges. Then, we suggest a techni-
cal infrastructure for the implementation of the 
multi-agent system. 
2 VARIETY PROBLEMS IN  
MASS CUSTOMIZATION  
Due to the high individualization level in mass 
customization, final products are not manufactured 
until a customer order arrives. This customer-pull 
system improves the planning situation in dynamic 
markets and avoids costs such as those due to final 
products’ inventory and special offers to incur. 
However, the huge variety induced in mass customi-
zation is associated with a high complexity and in-
volves costs which arise in the form of overheads. 
Rosenberg (1997) mentions that product complexity 
is essentially due to two main reasons which are (a) 
the variety of product types and groups and (b) the 
number of components being built in the products, 
as well as their connections with each other.  
An empirical study of Wildemann (2001) has 
shown that with the doubling of the number of prod-
uct variants, the unit costs would increase about 20-
35% for firms with traditional manufacturing sys-
tems. For segmented and flexible automated plants 
the unit costs would increase about 10-15%. Wilde-
mann concluded that an increase of product variety 
is associated with an inverted learning curve. Fur-
thermore, Rathnow (1993) depicts a huge product 
variety is not usually profitable and points out that 
there is a point Vopt. (optimal variety) from which the 
cost effects of product variety overcompensate its 
beneficial effects. Lingnau (1994) qualitatively ex-
amines cost effects which are involved when in-
creasing variety. He considers a functional organi-
zation structure and scrutinizes the effects of variety 
on sales, production, purchasing and research and 
development. Lingnau points out that variety gener-
ates additional costs in each function. For example, 
when introducing new variants, new distribution 
channels could be necessary. Increased variety also 
complicates the production planning and control and 
more setups leading to longer idle times in which are 
required. With higher variety the work-in-process 
inventory also increases and quality assurance 
measures should be intensified.  
The introduction or elimination of product vari-
ants are decisions which are made within the scope 
of variety steering. Blecker et al. (2003) make the 
distinction between variety management and variety 
steering. Variety management embraces the con-
cepts that can be applied in order to increase compo-
nent and process commonality levels during a com-
pany’s operations such as part families, building 
blocks, modular product architectures, etc. Unlike 
variety management concepts, variety steering con-
cepts essentially deal with external variety, which 
can be perceived by customers. In this paper, we as-
sume that the mass customizer has already imple-
mented a variety management concept and that the 
main decisions concern variety steering.  
The excess of variety and the resulting complex-
ity can endanger the success of mass customized 
products whose prices should not dramatically differ 
from the corresponding ones manufactured with a 
mass production system. That is why, it is relevant 
to efficiently cope with the internal effects of variety 
in mass customization. In addition to high internal 
complexity level during a company’s operations, va-
riety induces external complexity that has bad ef-
fects from a customer’s perspective. 
Due to the limited human information processing 
capacity, excessive variety could confuse customers. 
Furthermore, customers are not aware of their needs 
until they see them violated. By looking for suitable 
products in huge assortments, customers can experi-
ence stress, frustration or regret. Iyengar/Lepper 
(2000) also claim that in limited-choice contexts 
people are engaged in rational optimization, whereas 
in extensive-choice contexts people simply end their 
choice-making when they find a choice that is 
merely satisfactory, rather than optimal. Further-
more, Schwartz (2000) indicates that by adding new 
options, the choice situation would be less rather 
than more attractive and that some people would 
look for the help of e.g. experts, who make the deci-
sion for them. 
On the one hand, in order to avoid customers 
getting lost in huge product assortments, the mass 
customizer should support them during the interac-
tion process to help them find the product variants 
corresponding to their optimal choice. On the other 
hand, the mass customizer has to strongly consider 
the internal complexity by efficiently steering vari-
 ety. Therefore, a comprehensive solution approach 
must integrate both customer’s and supplier’s per-
spectives in one information system. 
3 A MULTI-AGENT APPROACH 
FOR VARIETY FORMATION 
AND STEERING  
Common configuration systems for mass cus-
tomization necessitate specific product knowledge 
and often overstrain customers. Therefore, we are 
convinced that these systems should be improved to 
better support customers during the elicitation proc-
ess. Blecker et al. (2004) opt for interaction systems 
which are capable of assisting customers through 
advisory. Thus, the interaction system should be able 
to capture a customers’ preferences and profile in 
order to display only the subset of relevant product 
variants which would better fulfil customers’ re-
quirements. From the huge product assortment, only 
the best variants succeed to be short-listed and dis-
played to customers. Consequently, in the long run 
these will better contribute to a supplier’s success. 
Those which are not short-listed will only trigger 
high complexity and are not relevant for customers. 
This would suggest that the product variants would 
compete with each other. That is why, it is necessary 
to define a mechanism setting the rules which or-
ganize the competition between variants. This leads 
one to consider a market mechanism supported by 
multi-agent technology. The complexity and fuzzi-
ness of the problem are further reasons for the use of 
a multi-agent approach.  
The multi-agent based system should dynami-
cally support each user during the interaction proc-
ess. This means that the system should iteratively 
generate and refine product variants according to 
specific customers’ needs. Concurrently, it supports 
the long term supplier’s variety steering. This is re-
alized by the decentralization of variety decisions 
which are supported by autonomous agents.  
At first, we present the assumption and defini-
tions required to build up the multi-agent system. 
Then, we conceptually describe how agents can 
reach agreements in order to form product variants. 
3.1 ASSUMPTION AND 
DEFINITIONS  
Pine (1993) pointed out that the best method to 
achieve mass customization is to develop products 
around modular architectures. Ericsson and Erixon 
(1999) defined modules as building blocks with de-
fined interfaces. By combining only a few modules, 
it is possible to construct a huge number of product 
variants. The economies of scale are reached 
through modules instead of products and economies 
of scope are attained when modules are built in dif-
ferent products. That is why the assumption of this 
paper is as follows: 
 
Assumption: Modular product architecture 
We assume that the complete set of product vari-
ants can be manufactured on the basis of modules. 
 
The main idea is to consider the module variants 
to be built in the different product variants as 
autonomous rational agents. It is more reasonable to 
consider the module variants as agents than the 
product variants because with a few modules, one 
can build up a very large number of product variants 
which can go up to billions. Thus, by considering 
modules as agents the problem remains manageable 
and the computational resources are not over-
strained. Therefore, we provide the following defi-
nition: 
 
Definition 1: Module agent 
Let M  be the set of all modules, 
{ }mMMMM  , . . . , , 21= . We call iM a module class. A 
module class iM contains a set of module vari-
ants )(21  , . . . , , iipii MVMVMV . p is a function associating 
an index i of a module class with the index 
)(ip referring to the number of module variants in a 
module class. With each module variant 
)( , . . . ,1 , ipjMVij = we associate an autonomous ra-
tional agent, called a module agent 
)( , . . . ,1 , ipjMAij = which disposes of resources and is 
able to perform tasks. 
 
Modules can be classified in must- and can-
modules. Must-modules are indispensable for en-
suring the basic product functionalities, whereas 
can- modules are optional. For example, an engine is 
a must-module for a car. Without an engine a car 
cannot ensure its basic functionality consisting of 
mobility. In contrast to the engine, an air-conditioner 
is a can-module because it does not disturb the main 
 functionalities a car must perform. In this context the 
term platform is defined in the technical literature in 
two distinctive views:  
• A product platform is the set of all modules re-
quired for the manufacturing of all possible 
product variants (e.g. Ericsson/Erixon, 1999). 
• A product platform can also be the appellation of 
a specific common module which is used in a 
great range of product variants (e.g. Piller/Warin-
ger, 1999; Wildemann, 2003). This definition is 
commonly used in the automobile industry.  
The second definition of platforms will be 
adopted in this paper because it considers the plat-
form as a module having an additional relevance in 
comparison to other modules, which is mainly due to 
its implementation frequency in product variants. 
The corresponding agents are called platform agents 
to make the distinction vis-à-vis other module 
agents. Furthermore, the set of all platform and 
module agents are grouped in an agent pool. All dif-
ferent agents are members of a multi-agent system 
whose main goal is to present only a subset of prod-
uct variants, which would best fit customers’ needs.  
Because only a subset is allowed to be displayed 
to customers, the product variants have to compete 
with each other. Due to the modular architecture of 
products, we can argue that the module variants also 
compete to be existent in the set of the presented 
product configurations. Being driven by a further 
motivation of this work to support variety steering 
decisions in mass customization, the module variants 
which do not resist competition should be elimi-
nated. Therefore, it is legitimate to provide the sec-
ond definition: 
 
Definition 2: Self-preservation 
Each module agent ijMA strives for ensuring its 
existence by having enough resources to survive. 
 
Definition 2 leads us to consider evolutionary 
theory which sees evolution as the result of selection 
by the environment acting on a population of organ-
isms competing for resources. The winners of the 
competition, those who are most fit to gain the re-
sources necessary for survival, will be selected, the 
others are eliminated (Kauffman, 1993). The re-
sources of an agent are stored in an account which is 
defined as follows:  
 
Definition 3: Module agent’s account 
Each module agent ijMA has revenues and ex-
penses that are summed up in an account ijAcc of 
monetary units. ijAcc constantly diminishes in the 
course of time. 
 
It is relevant to mention that the monetary units 
that a module agent has on its account do not relate 
to the prices customers pay. The account only serves 
as an internal steering mechanism for a multi-agent 
system. The account surplus rather refers to the ac-
tual resources of an agent ijMA . From definitions 2 
and 3, we can conclude that each agent endeavors to 
maximize its account surplus. A surplus of zero will 
mean that the module agent risks death leading to 
the elimination of the module variant. Furthermore, 
the second part of definition 3 means that the agent’s 
resources diminish in the course of time even if the 
agent does not carry out any task. To explain what a 
task is, we provide the following definition: 
 
Definition 4: Module agent’s task 
The task ijT of module agent is to form product 
variants by joining coalitions   , . . . ,1 , nkCk = . 
 
The allocation of tasks to groups of agents is 
necessary when tasks cannot be performed by a sin-
gle agent. The module agents on their own are not 
able to provide a solution. They need to cooperate in 
order to fulfill tasks. However, the autonomy princi-
ple of agents is preserved because each agent can 
decide whether to take part or not in a product vari-
ant. By forming coalitions each agent strives for its 
personal utility/account via cooperation. Module 
agents follow the economic principle of rationality 
and attempt to form a coalition which will maximize 
their own utilities. Furthermore, because of the het-
erogeneity of customer requirements, module agents 
may have different efficiencies in task performance 
due to their different capabilities. 
In order to participate in a coalition, the module 
agent has to pay a certain fee. It is noteworthy that 
as opposed to other work in multi-agent systems 
(e.g. Shehory and Kraus, 1995), one agent may par-
ticipate in more than one coalition. Moreover, these 
coalitions are dynamic and take place in real-time, 
after capturing customers’ preferences. However, a 
coalition may succeed or fail. This primarily de-
pends on the coalition’s result, which can be com-
plete or incomplete:  
 
Definition 5: Complete vs. incomplete 
coalitions 
We say that a coalition is complete if the coali-
tion formed by the module agents builds up a salable 
 product variant. A coalition is incomplete if the coa-
lition formed by the module agents does not build up 
a salable product variant. 
 
Note that an agent will join a coalition only if the 
payoff it will receive in the coalition is greater than, 
or at least equal to, what it can obtain by staying 
outside the coalition (Shehory and Kraus, 1995). In 
our case a module agent that does not participate in 
any coalition has a payoff of zero. Because the ac-
count surplus of an agent diminishes in the course of 
time, each agent should be interested in participating 
in beneficial coalitions to be able to reconstruct its 
resources and thus better ensuring its existence. 
However, there is no certainty about the success of 
coalition results. As aforementioned, each agent has 
to pay a certain fee in order to be allowed to partici-
pate in a coalition. But if the coalition that subse-
quently forms is incomplete or fails because it is not 
powerful enough to be displayed to customers, then 
the participation of an agent in a coalition is a waste 
of resources. Therefore, each agent has to be capable 
of estimating in advance the likelihood of the suc-
cess of the coalitions it joins. However, the module 
agents should remain as simple as possible and 
should not become very complex. The whole multi-
agent system has to contribute to problem solving 
and one agent should only dispose of the intelligence 
it requires in order to not waste computational re-
sources. 
3.2 THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
Firstly, it is relevant to determine the mechanism 
initiating a coalition. This being in reference to deci-
sions about (a) which module agents are able to be-
gin the formation of coalitions and (b) which reach-
ing agreement process should be implemented to co-
ordinate the module agents. We agree that platform 
agents are most suitable for initiating coalitions. We 
also assume that these agents dispose of an infinite 
account surplus. Therefore, they do not have to care 
about their existence. This is a legitimate assumption 
because the development of product platforms is 
generally cost-intensive. The development process 
itself may last for a duration of many years. Plat-
forms are also created to be the basic module of a 
wide range of product variants for a long period of 
time. For example, by canceling a platform in the 
automobile industry, this would mean to cancel all 
models and the corresponding variants which are 
supported by this platform. Thus, such a decision is 
strategic and should not be allocated to automated 
software agents. As in each decision in variety 
steering it should be supported by human agents 
who have the required competencies and informa-
tion. However, it is conceivable that each platform 
agent strives for being successful as much as possi-
ble, e.g. by contributing to the most sales’ volumes.  
On the basis of customers’ preferences, the type 
and the number of product platforms to form coali-
tions are determined. Note that:  
• a platform agent can be selected more than once, 
• each product variant is based on one platform,  
• each platform can be found in several product 
variants and, 
• the total number of the selected platform agents 
is also the utmost limit of the product variants 
which can be formed by coalitions.  
The coalitions take place at a certain point in 
time and form in order to fulfill the needs of one 
customer. When all resulting coalitions are com-
plete, then the number of product variants will be 
exactly equal to the number of selected platform 
agents provided that no identical coalitions form. 
The platform agents have the ability to steer the 
formation of coalitions by (a) fixing the set of mod-
ule agents which could contribute to the fulfillment 
of customers’ requirements and by (b) determining 
the mechanism according to which module agents 
can join coalitions.  
We propose to base the coalition formation 
mechanism on the target costing concept and a 
Dutch auction. Target costing is based on the price 
the customer is willing to pay. Starting from this 
price, it is possible to determine the utmost limit of 
the costs of each product function that is allowed to 
incur by taking into account the contribution of each 
function to the fulfillment of customer requirements. 
Further on, because each product component or 
module makes a certain contribution to the realiza-
tion of a product function it is possible to distribute 
the function costs on the modules respectively com-
ponents (Seidenschwarz, 2001). Thus, the result of 
target costing is an utmost limit for modules’ or 
components’ costs. The platform agents which are 
the auctioneers use these costs to initiate a Dutch 
auction. The module agents which compete to join 
the coalitions are the bidders. A Dutch auction is le-
gitimate in this case because each agent tends to de-
lay as much as possible in joining a sub-coalition in 
order to (a) better evaluate whether to participate or 
 not in a hitherto sub-coalition and (b) minimize as 
much as possible the fees to pay. But due to the 
product configuration constraints, when a module 
agent wins the bid, it may impose constraints on the 
other bidding agents which intend to take part of the 
sub-coalition. Thus, the intelligence of the module 
agent should enable it to proficiently estimate when 
and for which coalition it bids. These auctions will 
continue until all coalitions are formed. 
Although platform agents have an infinite ac-
count, we assume that they will also try to maximize 
the revenues they receive from module agents. We 
will describe in the next section how the product 
variants resulting from the coalitions are filtered af-
ter their formation. Only the set of product variants 
that are displayed to customers will receive revenues 
which are distributed on modules. The total col-
lected monetary units from all module agents are 
collected in an account and then distributed on the 
module agents participating in the few successful 
product variants by considering their contribution in 
the fulfillment of the product functions and their 
participation level. 
Up to now, we have only described what module 
and platform agents should perform and how the 
whole multi-agent system can reach agreements in 
order to form coalitions. But we have not mentioned 
what are the abilities an agent should have, to effec-
tively carry out its tasks. Module and platform 
agents have different tasks. Therefore, they have dif-
ferent abilities. Module agents strive for maximizing 
their utilities (accounts). That is why, they have to 
develop strategies in order to survive. Subsequently, 
they should be able to evaluate in advance the suc-
cess of the coalitions by estimating the probability 
that the formed product variants can be displayed to 
customers. Furthermore, they have to know when to 
bid and which coalition would be beneficial to join. 
Generally, as intelligent agents module agents have 
to update their knowledge from their own experience 
and the behavior of the other module agents per-
taining to the multi-agent environment, which means 
that they have to learn.  
In opposition to module agents, platform agents 
do not care about their existence due to their infinite 
account surplus. Furthermore, they decide which 
module agents are allowed to participate in the coa-
litions. Therefore, they are more powerful than 
module agents. Platform agents initiate and coordi-
nate the formation of coalitions. They are also capa-
ble of communicating with each other to avoid the 
formation of identical coalitions. Platform agents 
have the overview of the coalition while forming 
and can forbid the further bidding of module agents 
by considering the constraints imposed by module 
agents which have already joined the coalition.  
In the following we concentrate on module 
agents. We assume that the product platforms are 
capable of initiating the Dutch auction and that only 
product constraints may restrain the participation of 
module agents in coalitions. In order to represent the 
module agents, we use a mathematical tool from de-
cision theory. Decision theory defines a rational 
agent as one that maximizes the expected utility. The 
expected utility EU of an action is defined as (Rus-
sel/Norvig, 1995): 
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Let the function optf take as input a set of possi-
ble actions, a set of outcomes, a probability distribu-
tion and a utility function and let this function return 
an action. The defined behavior of optf is defined as 
follows (Russel/Norvig, 1995): 
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Wooldridge (2000) criticizes optf for building 
rational agents because optf requires an uncon-
strained search which can be very expensive when 
the space of all actions and their outcomes is very 
wide. But, in our case this critic does not seem to be 
strong enough because the action types that a mod-
ule agent can perform are (a) to participate in a coa-
lition (Participating is the action 1=α ) or (b) not to 
participate (Not participating is the action 0=α ). 
Thus, the number of action types a module agent 
disposes of are only two. Furthermore, the outcome 
of actions may be that either (a) the module agent is 
a member of a product variant which is selected in 
the final subset (Success of a coalition is the out-
come 1=ω ) or (b) the module agent is a member of 
 a product variant which is not selected in the subset 
to be presented to customers (Failure of a coalition is 
the outcome 0=ω ). That is why, we argue that it is 
legitimate to consider optf to build module agents. 
However, optf should be adapted to the requirements 
of the multi-agent system problem that was pre-
sented above. 
Suppose at a point in time t=0 the platform 
agents initiate coalitions. Each platform agent 
chooses which module agents are allowed to bid. For 
each module agent, the platform agent communi-
cates a function to a module class i having the fol-
lowing form: 
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As aforementioned, when a module agent joins a 
coalition, it may restrain the participation of other 
module agents also intending to join the coalition. 
Therefore, each module agent must be capable of 
evaluating the behavior of the other agents that 
could prohibit its participation. This behavior should 
be captured by the function Risk  which is a risk 
function of a module agent ijMA  : 
 
[ ] [ ] ( ) ( ) RTRiskRiskTRisk ==→  and 00/1,0,0:  
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Note that the function Risk is a function that 
leads the module agent to bid as early as possible in 
order to increase its chances in being a participant of 
a coalition. Let venueRe be the function which 
takes the value 0 when the agent is not a member of 
the coalitions representing the product variants dis-
played to customers and the value vRe when the 
product variants are displayed to customers. 
The utility function U of a module agent depends 
on the risk function which is supposed to decrease 
revenue during the auction process, the revenue 
function and the Dutch auction function. The 
adapted optf  for our case is: 
 
=Ω ),,,Re,,,( UPgvenueRiskAcf iopt  
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The adapted optf returns the point in time t at 
which the module agent has to bid for the Dutch 
auction to maximize its utility. But note that if [ ]Tt ,0∈  then 1=α and if there is no [ ]Tt ,0∈  
maximizing the utility ( )Tt >  then 0=α and the 
module agent intends on not participating in the 
coalition. 
Furthermore, suppose that a module agent 
ijMA is allowed to participate in p coalitions: { }pkCk ,,1 , K∈ . For each coalition the module 
agent estimates optf and at the point in time t=0 
where an auction begins, the module agent has to 
develop a plan 
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which indicates whether or not and when to bid for 
each coalition. For notation purposes, when 
0=kα , the module agent allocates to 
0
kt  an infinite 
value ( )∞=0kt , which is in accordance with the fact 
that an agent will never bid and then not to partici-
pate. Moreover, by developing a plan the module 
agent has to consider its account constraint. It is not 
allowed to pay for coalitions more than the account 
surplus. This means that surplusAccountfees∑ ≤  . It 
is also conceivable that the module agent wants to 
allocate only a certain sum of monetary units for the 
coalitions which should be formed to be presented to 
one customer. This depends on the self-preservation 
strategy the module wants to pursue.  
However, the agent plan determined at 0=t is 
not fixed for the whole auction process. The module 
agent has to adapt this plan according to the changes 
which could occur in its environment. Suppose that 
the tuples of ( )ijtPlan 0= are arranged so that 
000
1 pk ttt ≤≤≤≤ KK . Suppose that ∞≠∞≠
0
2
0
1   tandt  
and that at a point in time 01tt < an agent from the 
same class wins the bid or an agent from another 
class imposes participation constraints. At this point 
in time, the module agent has to estimate once again 
optf  for the remaining coalitions to determine 
whether and when to bid. This is legitimate because 
when the participation in one coalition fails the 
module agent can allocate the resources he has 
 planed to expend differently. The resulting plan at a 
point in time 1=t is: 
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The application of the described process will 
continue until different coalitions are formed.  
Recapitulating, we can say that the main advan-
tages of the developed multi-agent approach are: 
• the easy maintenance of the system: when intro-
ducing new module variants or eliminating old 
ones, it is sufficient to introduce or eliminate 
module agents,  
• the dynamic variety generation during the inter-
action process and variety steering as well as, 
• the application of a market mechanism concept 
which lets the intelligent agents themselves de-
cide according to the current situation about 
their suitability to fulfill real customers’ re-
quirements. Such a market mechanism based 
approach enables us to efficiently carry out the 
coordination mechanism, even for a high num-
ber of involved agents (Shehory et al., 1998). 
4 TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE 
In this section we present a complete model for 
variety formation and steering based on the multi-
agent system approach developed in the previous 
section. We propose to interface the module agents’ 
pool to a customer advisory system to support dy-
namic variety formation during the real time cus-
tomer advisory process.  
Advisory systems are software systems that 
guide customers according to their profile and re-
quirements through a „personal”, customer oriented 
advisory process to elicit their real needs from an 
objective point of view (Blecker et al., 2004). Dur-
ing the advisory process, the system suggests the 
customer product variants according to his profile 
and refines them through the dialog. At the end of 
the advisory process, the customer is supported with 
product variants which fulfill his real needs.  
At each advisory session the multi-agent system 
dynamically creates coalitions of product variants 
that can be recommended to the user. Therefore, we 
aim at integrating the system into the existing infor-
mation system landscape. Figure 1 depicts the ar-
chitecture of such a system. 
Beside the agents’ pool the architecture consists 
of the following main elements:  
• an online interface to the data of the advisory 
system that provides a customer’s preferences,  
• an interface to the supplier’s back office which 
for instance comprises a CRM or OLAP system, 
• additional filtering and target costing data 
sources, 
• librarian agents that have access to all back of-
fice systems and make proper data available for 
the other components, 
• coordination agents that coordinate the variety 
formation in the agents’ pool and,  
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Figure 1: Technical architecture for an agent based variety formation and steering 
 • a blackboard that supports communication be-
tween the module agents’ pool and its environ-
ment.  
The system also supports variety steering. As 
was mentioned in the previous section, the account 
balance of the agents provides a measurement of the 
success of a module variant which constantly can be 
analyzed by a variety steering agent or humans.  
Before we technically describe the system, we 
will describe the main idea on the basis of a sce-
nario: During the advisory process the system cap-
tures the customer’s requirements according to his 
knowledge level. During the advisory dialog the 
system presents the user a proposal of several prod-
uct variants according to his profile and preferences. 
These are refined through the advisory dialog which 
leads to dynamically refined suggestions for product 
variants. Finally, the system generates suggestions 
of product variants that meet real customer needs.  
The creation of a valid subset of product variant 
coalitions is dynamically carried out by following 
steps:  
(1) A so-called librarian agent obtains data from the 
online advisory data source. These data can con-
tain both user data and product preferences – de-
pending on the knowledge level of the user. If 
the user is familiar to the domain, he can make a 
decision on the product level; otherwise the sys-
tem gathers his needs, which can be captured in 
e.g. a language different form product specifica-
tion. For instance, data can contain personal data 
such as the customer’s age or marital status, his 
personal preferences or desired product attrib-
utes. In the automotive domain it could be about 
a male customer with two children who is sporty, 
but prefers an economical car.  
(2) The information about the customer is supple-
mented by the librarian agent: Depending on 
whether the customer is recognized (e.g. by a 
login process) this data can be obtained from the 
CRM data source where both the customer’s in-
terests and his past buying behavior are stored. 
Otherwise the information can be provided from 
the OLAP data source where traditional web 
mining techniques such as clustering are used to 
extend the customer’s profile. The result of this 
process is an improved profile of the customer’s 
needs.  
(3) In order to support the negotiation process in the 
module agents’ pool, the librarian agent calls for 
service from the filtering component in order to 
convert the customer attributes to product attrib-
utes. For instance, this can be based on expert 
rules or statistical methods. As an example the 
attributes of (1) could be inferred that the car 
should be a sedan with no automatic transmis-
sion that runs on diesel.  
(4) The target costing component is used to estimate 
the costs of the product’s functions that the cus-
tomer probably will have to pay for. For in-
stance, this could be based on past sales of a 
clustered customer group.  
(5) The data is passed on to the coordination agent 
who monitors the load of the module agents’ 
pool. If the number of customer configuration 
orders is below a certain limit, the coordination 
agent sets forth a request for new product vari-
ants with the desired product properties onto the 
blackboard. Note that these product properties 
derived from the customer attributes only support 
the negotiation process, they are not constraints. 
Besides for that, the coordination agent selects 
both appropriate platform agents who should 
carry out the auction, and the number of coali-
tions of product variants they should form. This 
decision is based on the customer’s profile and 
the product model.  
(6) Now the negotiation process is carried out as de-
scribed in the previous chapter, until all coali-
tions are formed. The resulting coalitions are put 
back onto the blackboard where they are re-
moved from the coordination agents and passed 
to the validation agent.  
(7) The validation agent requests data from informa-
tion agents in order choose a subset of the avail-
able coalitions of variants to present them to the 
customer. This task is performed on the basis of 
validation which is a kind of „reverse mapping”. 
That means that the properties of the selected 
coalitions are mapped to customer attributes as a 
kind of verification. The best coalitions are pre-
sented and rewarded with monetary revenue for 
the accounts.  
(8) If the customer makes the decision to buy a cer-
tain product variant of the presented subset, it is 
conceivable that an additional reward would be 
sent back to the accounts of the corresponding 
module agents.  
(9) Additionally, we propose the use of the account 
level of each module agent as an indicator to 
support variety steering decisions. In an inde-
pendent process the system makes suggestions to 
eliminate module variants. If the account level is 
negative or low in comparison with competing 
 module variants, this is an indicator to remove 
the module variant. Furthermore, the introduc-
tion of new module variants can affect the inter-
nal and external complexities which can be esti-
mated by computing suitable key metrics 
(Blecker et al., 2003).  
In conclusion we can see that the complexity is 
spread throughout all system components in the 
multi agent system:  
• The module agents’ pool is responsible for carry-
ing out a negotiation for forming product variant 
coalitions,  
• coordination agents manage the blackboard and 
the general interface between the agents’ pool 
and its environment,  
• librarian agents not only interface the back office 
systems, they independently obtain data and 
process them in an intelligent way to support the 
other agents optimally,  
• a validation agent carries out the validation of the 
module variants coalition independently of the 
decisions of the other system components.  
For the implementation of such, we propose to 
base the system on Java technology. This not only 
ensures platform independence, it also provides a 
uniform framework for the implementation of all 
components.  
All back office systems such as CRM, OLAP or 
other data sources must be connected via custom 
interfaces, for example by XML. On the variety 
formation system, data can be provided by web ser-
vices so that the agents can access the services. The 
agents’ pool can be realized in one virtual machine. 
Due to the decision to represent module variants in-
stead of product variants as agents, this assumption 
is admissible. This way we can lower the communi-
cation costs because this enables a direct interaction 
between the agent instances. The coordination be-
tween the agents’ pool and the external agents is car-
ried out via a blackboard where all agents are regis-
tered. Coordination agents, validation agents and li-
brarian agents can be distributed for reasons of load 
balancing. Communication between these agents can 
be performed via Java’s RMI (Remote Method In-
vocation) or CORBA to support other systems. 
5 CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, we have depicted the main prob-
lems which are triggered by increasing variety in 
mass customization. Variety involves an internal 
complexity inside a company’s operations, as well 
as an external complexity from a customer’s per-
spective. To mitigate both complexities’ problems, 
the main idea is to provide an information system 
solution which is capable of both supporting cus-
tomers during the interaction process by proposing 
and refining product variants and simultaneously 
supporting variety steering decisions. The agent 
technology is able to be identified as a suitable ap-
proach to cope with this problem in a decentralized, 
self-coordinating way.  
The developed system integrates both customer’s 
and supplier’s perspectives in one information sys-
tem. We outlined how module variants can be repre-
sented as intelligent agents that negotiate with each 
other to ensure their survival within the scope of va-
riety steering. Based on the decision theory’s model 
for rational agents, we formally define the function 
that an agent strives to optimize. The negotiation 
process between the intelligent agents is based on 
the target costing concept and a Dutch auction. This 
is also described in a formal way defining the possi-
ble functions which have to be determined. Because 
we intend to carry out simulations of the entire sys-
tem, several functions which determine the intelli-
gence of the defined agents should be tested. Based 
on these simulations we will decide which imple-
mentation will lead to a working prototype. Fur-
thermore, a technical architecture for the agent-
based variety formation and steering in mass cus-
tomization is proposed. 
The main advantages of the developed approach 
are the easy maintenance of the system, the dynamic 
variety generation and variety steering, as well as the 
application of a market mechanism concept sup-
ported by agent technology. The adopted market 
mechanism presents a relevant approach enabling 
one to overcome the shortcomings of existing inter-
action systems and variety steering methods. Thus, 
instead of building rigid rules in the interaction sys-
tem that map customer requirements into product 
attributes, the proposed market mechanism approach 
lets the intelligent agents themselves decide accord-
ing to the current situation about their suitability to 
fulfill real customers’ requirements. Furthermore, 
the market mechanism enables us to connect two 
relevant concepts in mass customization, namely 
which product variants should be retained in the 
product assortment and which specific ones from 
this assortment should be selected and offered to a 
particular customer. 
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